



# COUNTERING TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY

**INTERNATIONAL  
PERSPECTIVES**

STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

**v.1**



EDITED BY JAMES J. F. FOREST



**PRAEGER  
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COUNTERING TERRORISM AND  
INSURGENCY IN THE  
21ST CENTURY

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## INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

VOLUME 1: STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

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Edited by James J. F. Forest



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## EDITOR'S NOTE

Governments have been countering the threat of terrorism and insurgency since the establishment of the Westphalia system of nation-states. However, the rapid evolution of science and technology over the past 100 years—from the invention of dynamite to commercial air travel and the Internet—has enabled new forms of terrorist and insurgent activity. It is thus likely that further technological advances over the next 100 years will yield similar results, as today's terrorist and insurgent groups have proven to be adaptable, learning organizations. This three-volume set, *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century*, seeks to encourage the development of learning organizations among national security professionals by examining what we currently know about the strategic application of hard and soft power in countering the sources and facilitators of terrorism. As a collection, the thematic essays and focused case studies represent an ambitious effort to capture existing knowledge in the field of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, and draw lessons (from successes as well as failures) that will inform new, adaptable strategies to counter the new threats that—judging from historical trends—will no doubt emerge over the next century.

At the outset, it is necessary to address why this publication covers both terrorism and insurgency, as there is confusion about these terms among many in the academic, media, and policymaking communities. In some countries that have faced the threat of violence for many years—including Colombia, Ireland, Spain, Sri Lanka, and Turkey—societies have grappled with additional terms like “paramilitaries” and “freedom fighters,” but the general view reflected throughout the chapters of this publication is that all groups or individuals (including insurgents) who engage in the act of terrorism can be considered terrorists. In essence, the act of terrorism defines its perpetrator as a terrorist, regardless of the ideological motivation behind such acts.

According to the Department of Defense, terrorism is defined as “the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological,” while insurgency is

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defined as “an organized resistance movement that uses subversion, sabotage, and armed conflict to achieve its aims. . . . [and which] seek to overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power within the country.” In teaching my classes on these topics to future U.S. Army officers at West Point, the distinction I make is that insurgents can and do use terrorism (among other forms of violence), but insurgents are but one type of violent nonstate actors who may choose to use terrorism. In other words, not all insurgents use terrorism, and not all terrorists are part of an insurgency. Further, while the use of violence by insurgents to target governments is driven by a particular ideology, terrorists use violence against a range of targets (including governments) to advance their ideology.

While such distinctions may seem academic to most readers, they are actually quite important when formulating strategic, tactical, and policy responses to the threat posed by terrorism and insurgencies. As described in Volume 1 of this publication, strategies and tactics for countering insurgency are an important aspect of our knowledge base on countering terrorism, and vice versa. In both cases, experts have emphasized that the use of force to counter an organization whose objectives resonate with a larger disaffected population yields limited (if any) success. Instead, it is argued, the ideology, political, and socioeconomic aspects of an organization—through which it derives its financial support, recruits, and sympathizers from amongst the local population—must be addressed. In other words, the use of hard power in countering terrorism (including insurgencies that employ terrorist tactics) must be complemented by elements of soft power.

The link between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism is also informed by recent analyses which suggest that the al Qaeda movement can be described as a global insurgency, seeking to replace the existing Westphalia-based system of nation-states with a global caliphate in which Islamic law reigns supreme. Recent terror attacks in Bali, Madrid, London, and Cairo, as well as disrupted terror plots in Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, are all seen as examples of how individuals and groups around the world have been inspired by al Qaeda's ideology to commit violence as part of a strategy to change the policy and behavior of these nation-states. In other words, it is argued, al Qaeda uses terrorism tactically and operationally to advance its global insurgent strategy. When described in these terms, the U.S.-led global effort against al Qaeda can be considered to be fighting both terrorism and insurgency. Thus, *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century* addresses the many challenges that stem both types of threats to our security.

Another source of confusion in the study of terrorism and insurgency involves disagreement over the proper spelling of certain groups (or, rather, the spelling of the transliteration from the original language into English). For example, a brief survey of the literature reveals that a certain Lebanese militant group can be spelled Hizballah, Hezbollah, Hizbullah,

Hezbollah, and Hizbollah. For these volumes, we have standardized the spelling of certain common names across all the chapters, such as al Qaeda (because this is how several agencies of the U.S. government are now spelling it), Hizbollah (because this is how the group spells it on their English language Web site), and Osama bin Laden (rather than Usama). Finally, it is important to note that while many chapters discuss aspects of the “global war on terrorism (GWOT),” we recognize that this term has fallen out of favor among many in the academic and policy communities. However, there currently is a worldwide effort to reduce the capabilities of globally networked terror movements like al Qaeda, and in the absence of an equally useful short-hand reference for this effort, GWOT serves an important role.

At this point in the development of the global counterterrorism effort, it is particularly important to pause for reflection on a number of critical questions. What do we know about effectively countering terrorism and insurgencies? What are the characteristics of successful or unsuccessful counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns? What do we need to learn in order to do these things more effectively? *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century* addresses these and related questions, and in doing so contributes to national security policy as well as to our understanding of the common threat and how it can be defeated. Chapters of this publication address many different aspects of the unconventional warfare puzzle, examining the most important diplomatic, information, military/law enforcement, and economic/financial dimensions to regional and global cooperation in countering terrorism and insurgency, and providing specific examples of these dimensions in practice.

Authors in the first volume address issues of important strategic and tactical concern, organized around the primary instruments of power through which nations pursue their counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts. These instruments can generally be described as either hard power (the use of force by military and law enforcement) or soft power (including diplomacy, information, and intelligence). The second volume provides a variety of insights on how to assess and combat the sources and facilitators of political violence, including state-sponsors of terror, authoritarian regimes, criminal network activity, border insecurity, and the global struggle for influence among societies. As highlighted by several authors in this volume, the community of responsibly governed democracies faces uniquely complex challenges in combating terrorism and insurgencies while maintaining civil freedoms. And contributors to the third volume offer in-depth analyses of historical events and lessons learned in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Each volume contains a preface and introductory chapter, describing the contributed essays and providing an intellectual background for the discussions that follow.

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This project is the final installment of an ambitious trilogy published by Praeger Security International. The first of these—the three-volume *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes* (published in 2005)—intends to help readers understand the nature of the threat by exploring what transforms an ordinary individual into a terrorist. This was followed by the three-volume *Homeland Security: Protecting America's Targets* (published in 2006), which explored the ongoing efforts in the United States to secure our borders and ports of entry, and to protect our public spaces and critical infrastructure from future terror attacks. The volumes of *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century* complement these earlier publications by focusing our attention on the broad, worldwide effort to actively confront those who threaten or use political violence against our communities. Together, these nine volumes are meant to provide a central, authoritative resource for students, teachers, policymakers, journalists, and the general public, as well as stimulate new ideas for research and analysis.

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The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

# PREFACE

The chapters of this first volume of *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century* advance our understanding of national security strategy challenges, as well as raise important questions and issues for further research. Fighting terrorists and insurgents effectively requires a variety of strategies and tactics, and their success or failure is largely dependent on context. After an introductory chapter, the volume addresses the use of hard power, soft power, and intelligence, and the strategies that guide these efforts.

## PART I: STRATEGIC AND POLICY DIMENSIONS

The first section of the volume begins with a thoughtful examination of strategy and grand strategy by Brad Bowman, a U.S. Army officer and a faculty member at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. He argues that the current U.S. grand strategy overrelies on military operations, misidentifies the nature of the conflict with al Qaeda, ignores the struggle's true "center of gravity," and neglects major sources of radicalization. After defining the terms "grand strategy" and "strategy," Bowman describes their theoretical and practical relationship to one another, and suggests that strategy—which is essentially military operations—often usurps the nation's grand strategy and political interests. He then explores the nature of the current conflict with al Qaeda, arguing that a misdiagnosis of the nature of the struggle has encouraged the United States to neglect the central role of Muslim popular opinion. He concludes by offering a set of strategic recommendations for addressing sources of Muslim radicalization.

Next, Douglas Borer and Michael Freeman of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School provide a thoughtful discussion of strategy and establish a framework for the analysis of U.S. performance in the global war on terrorism (GWOT). At its essence, they explain, strategy is an iterative or dynamic process, one that is shaped by a given context and defined by the relational environment between various actors. As such, a successful strategy in one situation will most likely be different than a successful

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strategy in another. They note that while democracy and democratization is the primary strategy by which the United States has chosen to defeat the scourge of terrorism, military force has thus far proven inadequate for democratizing either Afghanistan or Iraq. Further, democracy is an inherently risky method for organizing U.S. grand strategy in the GWOT. It may be legitimate to the average American, but it is not likely to be effective or practical. Democratization has brought into elected governments organizations such as Hizbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas in Palestine, yet neither group has given up terror. Even though many might contest the notion that Iran is democratic, the government there is chosen by the people in hotly contested multiparty elections, yet Iran remains the single most important sponsor of terror in the world. Overall, it seems that democracy—rather than security—has become an end in itself. This unjustified faith in the deterministic power of democracy to produce peace has channeled U.S. strategy away from alternative approaches that might prove more effective.

The next chapter, by Leonard Weinberg and William Eubank of the University of Nevada, explores the impact of terrorism on the success or failure of armed insurgencies the United States is likely to encounter during the twenty-first century. They begin with a brief review of 50 years' worth of insurgency, and conclude that terrorism used in isolation from other types of violence and other forms of political activity rarely succeeds. However, when combined with other forms of armed struggle and an adroit political strategy, terrorist violence may become an important device in convincing foreign forces and foreign audiences that the costs of their continued involvement outweigh the potential benefits. They conclude with a few observations of the future. First, guerrilla warfare, as in Iraq, is likely to be an increasingly city-centered activity. Second, American forces should only be committed to armed conflicts in the Third World when a vital interest is clearly at stake, one that is clear not merely to key decision makers but also to the general public (whose members, after all, will be asked to absorb the costs involved). And finally, if there is an interest to be defended but not a vital one, and political means do not succeed, the United States and the other advanced democracies would appear to be better off cultivating proxies who, in turn, would be able to act as surrogates.

The next chapter explores the unique challenges of developing and implementing counterterrorism policy in a liberal democracy. Here, Jennifer Holmes of the University of Texas at Dallas observes the tension between an aggressive, preemptive investigative response to terrorism and a response that restricts government activity to safeguard individual liberties, and argues that the state needs to be strong enough to have a functioning judicial system, discourage the emergence of violence, mount a vigorous defense, and maintain citizen support. However, good

intelligence, effective coordination, and a competent police and judiciary cannot alone squash internal terrorism with a significant domestic source of support. In this case, the political realm of the conflict is extremely important. Moreover, being responsive to understandable grievances may increase the government's popular support and decrease overt and tacit support for terrorists. Overall, creating an effective intelligence community, increasing security, and maintaining principles of good governance are essential to democracies confronting terrorism. The greatest threat to progress is impatience, which increases the temptation to emphasize one aspect of a strategy in the short term. Lopsided efforts will not bring long-term success, she concludes, and may undermine the chances of a long-term, comprehensive peace.

Similar challenges are addressed in the next chapter—by Harvey Rishikof, a professor at the National War College—on the moral, ethical, and legal aspects of the Bush administration's current "global war on terrorism." He argues that waging a war against terrorism challenges conventional norms of national security operations, and requires the state to rethink the measures, practices, and the instruments used to prosecute against the "tactic of terrorism." Projection of force, clandestine activities, law enforcement cooperation, diplomacy, and covert actions are part of the arsenal in the fight against terrorism, and thus individual soldiers, airmen, sailors, marines, special forces, and other government agents are forced to rethink what "moral, ethical, and legal" orders mean. But there are a number of controversial challenges for just war theory and international law that Rishikof raises in his chapter. For example, How does one deal with the issue of "targeting" terrorists? What is the process due to "unlawful" combatants in detention? What is torture and what is lawful coercive interrogation? Thoughtful responses to these important challenges will determine how history judges U.S. actions and success (or failure) in the global war on terrorism.

This discussion is followed by a chapter on the importance of interagency cooperation in combating suicide bombings. Authored by professor James Kiras at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, at Maxwell Air Force Base, the chapter calls for greater cooperation between agencies in developing and implementing potential solutions to suicide terrorism. The discussion begins by looking at the peculiar challenges that suicide bombing presents to those charged with preventing terrorism, and suggests that irregular adversaries will always seek to exploit systemic and other vulnerabilities in order to carry out their attacks successfully. On the basis of those challenges, Kiras argues that greater interagency cooperation can interdict or disrupt suicide bombing throughout its life cycle. The ultimate result of seamless cooperation ideally is the prevention of all future suicide bombing attacks. Sadly, this state of affairs will remain the ideal for some time, as the concluding section of this chapter suggests.



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Thus potential reformers face a particularly troublesome choice: change the mechanisms (and consequently, the nature) of democratic government in order to improve efficiency and effectiveness, or accept marginal change that leaves exploitable vulnerabilities in place.

In the final chapter of this section on strategy and policy issues, Michael Kraft describes the U.S. government's counterterrorism research and development programs. Dozens of federal agencies are working to develop a wide variety of equipment and tools, and millions of dollars go into developing devices and methods to detect conventional explosives (as well as biological, chemical, and radiological weapons) before they can cause mass casualties. These initiatives are intended to save lives by either helping prevent terrorist attacks or minimizing the damage if they do take place. Kraft provides an overview of the development of the government's testing and evaluation programs, describes the major coordinating groups—particularly the interagency coordinating body, the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG)—and offers an illustrative sampling of some of the individual agency programs. He observes a need for research in new subject areas, such as detecting improvised explosive devices, as well as improvements in older systems, including airport X-ray machines and scanners. Further, the organizational framework for these initiatives has changed and continues to evolve, most markedly since the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and there is a significant need for more effective coordination and working relationships between TSWG and DHS. Overall, the chapters of this section provide an interesting review of important strategic and policy challenges for countering terrorism in the twenty-first century.

**PART II: HARD POWER**

The next section of the volume explores the use of so-called kinetic or hard power in combating terrorists and insurgents. The first chapter of this section examines the specific role of junior officers in contemporary military engagements. Here, Amos Guiora of the Case Western University School of Law and Martha Minow of Harvard University explain that when considering the training and preparation of junior military leaders for fighting terrorism and insurgency, there are three areas in which improvements can be made: the use and gathering of intelligence, clear articulation of the mission, and awareness of legal responsibilities. In today's conflicts, special focus must be given to the needs of the junior leader—typically, it is the platoon leader and his noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who are charged with translating mission and strategy into tactics. Based on lessons learned from the Israeli experiences with countering terrorism, this chapter reveals that more can be done to prepare our junior leaders adequately for their missions. A focus on counterterrorism

puts into stark relief the kinds of real-time and accessible intelligence, advanced training in law, and clear articulation of mission that junior leaders demand.

The next chapter, by James Carafano and Alane Kochems of The Heritage Foundation, addresses the role of private contractors in assisting militaries and civilian government agencies throughout the world in such areas as planning, training, logistics, and security. Employing contractors in the war on terror, or for that matter any national security purpose, has both distinct advantages and disadvantages. Military contractors are seen as having inherent advantages over militaries with regard to cost, flexibility, and responsiveness. Relying on military contractors though does have its share of risks, including safety and liability issues, performance, force management, compliance with international and domestic laws, and lost resources because a capability is outsourced rather than retained. With this increase in contractor use and the advent of privatized military firms (PMFs), the question is now how to determine the right mix of forces to most effectively and efficiently complete a task or mission. In some cases, military contractors may be the best choice; however, they are not the perfect fit for every mission or the right solution for all skill or manpower shortages. Instead, governments should assess the risks of employing various options and then choose the best one. They conclude that government agencies should adopt comprehensive guidelines for making these decisions on the role of private military firms using a risk-based approach.

Next, Steven Marks, Thomas Meer, and Matthew Nilson—three U.S. military officers—describe a manhunting process based on law enforcement investigative methods, which can aid military forces in the hunt for terrorist fugitives in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. They begin by noting that commonalities exist among all types of manhunting, whether the hunter is pursuing a common criminal, international fugitive, or a terrorist. Then they describe methods that have yielded success for U.S. Marshals in hunting fugitives. Fugitives typically engage in “risk management” strategies, trying to reduce the risk of being captured, based on four criteria: familiarity, survivability, safety, and vulnerability. They will try to minimize his level of risk by relocating to suitable areas with access to food and water, or at least areas that are favorable for survival. In tracking fugitives, the most important aspect in investigative work is identifying and analyzing the nature and depth of relationships with friends, family members, and business associates. The authors then describe a five-step manhunting process: (1) conduct an initial background investigation via research; (2) build a social profile; (3) identify the support network; (4) analyze the hunter’s constraints and limitations; (5) and conduct analysis of competing hypotheses. This manhunting process is iterative and structures the problem so as to remove certain biases from the search operation. This analytical process provides better resolution as to the fugitive’s

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possible locations by limiting pre-established beliefs about the fugitive's behavior or hiding location.

In the next chapter, U.S. Army officer Richard Hughbank provides an analysis of law enforcement challenges in confronting terrorist cells in the United States. He begins by describing how both domestic and international terrorist organizations employ guerrilla warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures. Terrorism, by its nature, seeks out and exploits its opponents' weaknesses. Thus, the ability to identify and defeat the members of these organizations, cripple their infrastructure, and disrupt their financial resources lies in an understanding of modern guerrilla warfare as it develops in the twenty-first century within the United States. Terrorist operations have become more prevalent in the United States and are creating new challenges for federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. After reviewing the origin and nature of these challenges, this chapter offers some suggestions for countering guerilla warfare in twenty-first-century America.

The final chapter of this section, by Peter Spagnolo and Chadd Harbaugh of the Government Training Institute in Boise, Idaho, highlights the role of SWAT (an acronym which originally stood for Special Weapons Assault Team, but over the years has changed to the universally accepted Special Weapons and Tactics) in countering terrorism in America's communities. Nationwide, the focus for SWAT took a new direction on September 11, 2001; while the SWAT team has been the unit called in when specialized equipment and unconventional tactics are needed in situations such as hostage takings, barricaded armed criminals, and high-risk search warrants and arrests, their mission is again evolving, with SWAT teams becoming the first line of defense in the face of an armed ground assault on a target within the United States. One of the reasons for the change in direction is the fact that the terrorist is generally far better armed and trained than other types of criminals, and more likely to fight it out with the authorities. This chapter describes how the Department of Homeland Security has recently made it easier for law enforcement agencies to train their officers in critical areas of counterterrorism, antiterrorism, and SWAT tactics and techniques, and is working to bolster this vital counterterrorism organization in communities throughout the United States.

**PART III: SOFT POWER**

The next section of the volume explores the use of so-called "soft power" in the fight against terrorism. The first chapter of this section—coauthored by Robert Pauly, Jr., of the University of Southern Mississippi and U.S. Army Special Forces officer Robert Redding—demonstrates how the use of civil military operations and confidence-building measures among villagers at the local level can assist the United States and its

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domestic allies in minimizing support for al Qaeda and its affiliates in a given state under reconstruction. There are many examples across the world that demonstrate the growing role of U.S. military special forces (active duty and reserve units alike) in micro-level civil military operations designed to achieve progress in the GWOT one village or town at a time, in places ranging geographically from Iraq and Yemen to Mongolia and the Philippines. This chapter examines these types of operations and the grand strategy upon which they are based. The first part of their discussion provides a conceptual overview of the use of civil military operations to achieve strategic objectives. This is followed by an analysis of civil military operations in the context of the GWOT in particular. The third section examines case studies of U.S.-led civil military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines, followed by an examination of the insights that U.S. policymakers should draw from these case studies. The concluding section provides some observations on the prospects for the future of the use of civil military operations by the United States and its allies.

Next, Professor Jim Robbins of the National Defense University examines the so-called War of Ideas concept. He notes that the battlefronts in the war of ideas are not the only ways in which the civilized nations may confront terrorist ideology, nor is confrontation on the ideological plane alone a sufficient means of defeating the threat posed by armed extremism. Furthermore, it would be a mistake to believe that ideas cannot be suppressed using force. The terrorists in particular know this to be the case, and it has been demonstrated when proponents of their ideology take power. For example, an Afghani liberal reformer who lived under the Taliban regime would be at great risk of life and limb were he to have spoken out. Overall, Robbins argues, the War of Ideas is an important supporting aspect of the overall war on terrorism, but cannot replace nor is more important than the efforts of the military, intelligence community, and other agencies in disrupting and defeating terrorism.

The role of ideas and ideologies is also addressed in the next chapter, by Maha Azzam of the Chatham House, London. She examines the unique histories of Egypt and Saudi Arabia in countering radical Islamic terrorism, with particular focus on the core thinkers who shaped the militant ideology that has fueled violent group recruitment and attacks. In looking at how a state in the Middle East has dealt with the problem of terrorism, it is imperative to examine the way in which the revolutionary theory of the radical Islamists was countered and to a large degree discredited by the establishment. Finally, her chapter also explores the main issues that form the core of public disaffection in the region. Radical Islamist terrorism has occurred because of a confluence of a new revolutionary theory combined with widespread public disaffection toward the state. The problem the state faces is that it may be able to physically suppress these groups; it may, more fundamentally, counter and discredit their ideology. But so

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long as these issues remain unresolved, she argues, the region will remain unstable and the wider populations will continue to provide a pool from which new radicals might evolve.

The discussion of ideas and ideologies is extended further by Bruce Gregory of the Public Diplomacy Institute in Washington, DC, whose chapter provides a brief historical overview of public diplomacy and strategic communication in American foreign policy. He then describes how the Bush administration has until recently failed to demonstrate a sustained commitment to public diplomacy or give it a prominent role in the struggle against terrorism. Five years after 9/11, U.S. political leaders have just begun to recognize the need for change. Experts in the academic and private sectors, meanwhile, have all agreed: public diplomacy is vital to national security; it is broken and strategic level change is needed. A flurry of reports have been commissioned, and the appointment of Karen Hughes as the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (a position that was filled by a Senate-confirmed appointee for only 18 months during the Bush administration's first 4½ years in office) are promising signs of movement in a new direction. However, he notes, "transformational public diplomacy" requires political will and a presidential directive on strategic communication that is reinforced and made permanent with bipartisan congressional support and legislation. Finally, Gregory offers a set of recommendations for the future of America's public diplomacy and strategic communication efforts.

The next chapter of this section explores the role of the Internet in mobilizing new recruits for terrorist organizations. Timothy Thomas, of the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, observes that the cyber mobilization capabilities (mobilization enabled by computer-chip-driven devices such as cell phones, the Internet, CDs, etc.) of these organizations are designed to conduct psychological warfare activities, to propagandize insurgent successes and counter coalition allegations, and to recruit, finance, and train more fighters. Thus, he argues, a "counter cyber mobilization" strategy should be developed in order to assist in controlling the environment. His chapter discusses the precedents to the current use of the Internet in Iraq and Afghanistan; the U.S. information operations (IO) paradigm problem and its extension into understanding the virtual aspect of an insurgency; the use of the Internet by insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan; and coalition countermeasures to insurgent efforts. The chapter then concludes with some relevant recommendations for U.S. IO and counterinsurgency doctrine.

Finally, Jerrold Post—Director of the Political Psychology Program at the George Washington University and a former member of the Central Intelligence Agency—concludes this section on soft power with a chapter on the role of psychological operations in countering terrorism. Terrorism, he notes, is a vicious species of psychological warfare waged through the

media, “a war for hearts and minds.” If one accepts this premise, then the war against terrorism will not be won with smart bombs and missiles. One does not counter psychological warfare with high-tech weapons; one counters it with psychological warfare. And in this so-called war for hearts and minds, tending to overly rely on our technological superiority, we have fallen far behind our terrorist adversary. In his chapter, four elements of an integrated information operations program designed to counter terrorism are presented. A fifth element of a comprehensive security strategy, promoting societal resilience, is also discussed. In addition to these five general elements, Post gives special attention to countering suicide terrorism and weapons of mass destruction terrorism.

#### **PART IV: INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE**

The final section of the volume explores the crucial role that intelligence services play in countering terrorism and insurgency, and the challenges they face in “getting it right” 100 percent of the time. The section begins with a chapter by Jennifer Sims of Georgetown University, in which she examines the requirements and future challenges of the intelligence profession. She begins with a discussion of what history can tell us about the core features of past counterintelligence missions that have been successful against transnational groups. Sims then discusses the new features of the modern conflict that are changing the nature of the tradecraft needed to defeat terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda and associated groups. A key premise of her chapter is that one cannot evaluate an intelligence effort without identifying the nature of the competition, including the adversary and his strategy. This is because intelligence, at its core, is less about getting facts right or wrong than providing competitive advantages in foresight and situational awareness to decision makers. To some extent, she notes, the techniques that have worked in the past will remain important, including human intelligence from infiltration agents, all-source data fusion (phone intercepts and human agents, for example), and collaboration with law enforcement worldwide. The ability of the federal government to conduct double agent and deception operations should be improved and will necessarily have to be coordinated with overseas partners. Finally, she advocates for greater collaboration between the federal government and local agencies, intelligence liaison with foreign governments, and outreach to universities.

Tom Lansford of the University of Southern Mississippi furthers the discussion on multinational intelligence cooperation in his chapter. He notes that one of the most significant successes of the war on terror has been the substantial increase in intelligence cooperation between the United States and a range of countries and other international nonstate actors. Because of the dominant position of the United States in global antiterror efforts,

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his chapter places the United States at the center of current international efforts in intelligence cooperation. No other state currently has the military and intelligence capabilities of the United States, which makes the world's remaining superpower integral to multinational counterterrorism efforts. Concurrently, however, the United States has deep deficiencies in certain areas, especially human intelligence. Thus, he argues, only through multilateral cooperation and collaboration can the capabilities of the United States and other states be harnessed to successfully prosecute the global campaign against terrorism.

Multinational intelligence cooperation is also the topic of the next chapter, by Magnus Norell of the Swedish Defense Research Agency, who provides a detailed analysis of the benefits and challenges of this from a European perspective. While there has been considerable discussion after 9/11 about what roles various national agencies should have (the police vs. the military, for example), within the EU it is still the police force who is identified as the "lead" agency in regard to counterterrorism operations, largely because both the Union and its members have preferred to see terrorism—conceptually and legally—as a form of serious and organized crime. Norell argues that the underlying premise for this state of affairs is flawed, and does not take into account the fact that other agencies might have knowledge—unbeknownst to the police, due to a lack of coordination and the flow of necessary intelligence—that can be of critical value to any counterterrorism operation. Moreover, the structures of the EU make it inherently difficult to overcome the limitations and bureaucratic obstacles that make intelligence coordination among several actors—that is, on a Union level—so difficult. The chapter argues that as long as certain structural flaws in the system remain, nothing fundamental will change in the way the EU is trying to deal with the issue of intelligence coordination concerning counterterrorism policy. He calls upon the EU to critically examine the underlying structures in the Union, identify a "lead" agency, and provide new resources, and concludes with some recommendations that can be of value in countering these flaws in the EU's structure.

Another comparative perspective on intelligence is provided in the chapter by Ami Pedahzur of the University of Texas and Arie Perliger of the University of Haifa, who draw lessons from the experiences of the Israeli Secret Services in countering terrorism over the last four decades. They note that the Israeli intelligence community failed to forecast the rise of Shiite terror in southern Lebanon in 1982 and the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank territories in 1987, among other events. In addition, despite the imaginative stories told of the long arm of the State of Israel able to reach terrorists all over the world, reality teaches that apart from some high-profile operations where relatively low-level terrorists or those already out of operational circles were captured or assassinated, the number of terrorists targeting Israel has only increased with the years, their

capabilities have improved, and the number of victims is immeasurably higher than in the past. In the end, the wide majority of special hostage-rescue operations have ended in partial or complete failure. In their chapter, Pedhazur and Perliger examine the gap between the aura of invincibility surrounding the Israeli intelligence community and the continual deterioration of the Israeli security situation. They first describe the challenges placed before intelligence organizations charged with coping with terrorism, and then analyze how the Israeli intelligence agencies operate under such conditions, and conclude with lessons to be learned from Israel's long history of struggle with terrorism.

Next, Orion Lewis of the University of Colorado and Erica Chenoweth of Harvard University examine the sometimes overlooked value of open source information for informing intelligence analysis. In particular, they note, many Washington insiders—including CIA analysts and 9/11 Commission members—have recently argued for an expansion of open source intelligence (OSINT) capabilities. Indeed, a unit at the CIA is now dedicated specifically to OSINT collection. While these activities are a step in the right direction, they argue, the government should further develop an organizational strategy in which academic and private professionals can supplement intelligence-gathering efforts. Their chapter offers new policy ideas to improve both the technical infrastructure of government communications as well as the organizational infrastructure of U.S. intelligence that allows the United States to prevent future terrorist attacks. They suggest applying the methods of open source production to the existing intelligence infrastructure, and nurturing a broad-based “national anti-terrorism intelligence forum” (or “virtual community of experts”) who would supplement the process of intelligence gathering by incorporating the collective knowledge of the terrorism research community into the government's OSINT program. This approach would help to overcome budgetary and human resource constraints that plague current OSINT efforts, and presents a mutually beneficial arrangement that would benefit government, first responders, academia, and the broader public alike.

OSINT is also addressed in the next chapter, by Aaron Danis of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission—but from a much different perspective. He provides a unique analysis of al Qaeda's use of many sources of information (including the Internet) in gathering intelligence throughout the 1990s on potential targets worldwide, as part of a long-range plan to attack the United States, the West, and “apostate” Middle East regimes. He describes how al Qaeda surveilled targets in Europe, Africa, Indonesia, the Middle East, and America, and analyzes how successful it was in penetrating American homeland security. He also examines three key questions: “Could al Qaeda attempt to do this again? What would such an attempt look like? and How could U.S. intelligence, counterintelligence, and law



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enforcement organizations defeat domestic terrorist surveillance and prevent an attack?" He concludes that a domestic countersurveillance center would be a good idea, though it would require the integration of domestic and foreign immigration expertise and databases, and information on daily immigration, among other elements. Based on the haphazard (and not always successful) bureaucratic counterterrorism efforts attempted by the U.S. government since 9/11, particularly the Terrorist Threat Integration Center-to-NCTC evolution, it remains to be seen whether the U.S. government can formulate a coherent and effective terrorist counter-surveillance strategy and organization in the U.S. homeland.

The final chapter of this volume, by Joshua Sinai of The Analysis Corporation, offers a model that can be used by intelligence agencies to forecast the spectrum of warfare that a terrorist group is likely to conduct against a specific adversary. He suggests that to adequately assess the likelihood and magnitude of the types of threats posed by contemporary terrorism, three issues need to be addressed. First, threat assessments need to focus on three types of warfare that characterize this spectrum of terrorist operations: conventional low impact (CLI), conventional high impact (CHI), or chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) warfare, also known as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Second, one needs to focus on the characteristics of terrorist groups that shape and define the type of warfare that they are likely to employ to achieve their objectives, starting with the nature of their leadership, motivation, strategy, supporting constituencies, and other factors such as capabilities, accelerators, triggers, and hurdles that are likely to propel them to pursue CLI, CHI, or CBRN warfare (or a combination of the three). Third, we must focus our efforts on determining the disincentives and constraints that are likely (or not) to deter terrorist groups away from CBRN warfare, which is the most catastrophic (and difficult) form of potential warfare, particularly when these groups can resort to conventional explosives which have become increasingly more lethal and "catastrophic" in their impact. Analytically, therefore, terrorist groups currently operating on the international scene (or newly emergent ones) need to be viewed as potential CLI, CHI, or CBRN warfare actors (or a combination of the three), based on an understanding of the factors likely to propel them to embark on such types of warfare against their adversaries.

## **CONCLUSION**

Together, these chapters address an impressive breadth of topics related to our nation's security. As noted earlier, success in countering terrorism and insurgency requires the effective application of hard power, soft power, and intelligence, as well as comprehensive strategies that unite these in a concerted effort. However, there are obviously other issues to

explore beyond what is covered in this volume. Thus, this collection will hopefully also stimulate the reader to pursue further research on their own, in order to expand our collective understanding of how our military, law enforcement, diplomacy, and intelligence professionals can most effectively counter terrorism and insurgency in the twenty-first century.

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New contributions to the study of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency have never been more urgently needed. Each of the chapters in these three volumes is the product of thoughtful research and analysis, and I offer my sincere thanks to the authors for their hard work and commitment to excellence. The insights and suggestions they have provided in these pages will undoubtedly inform discussions and debate in a variety of policymaking and academic settings for the foreseeable future.

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